Abstract-Ride-sharing is a service that enables drivers to share their trips with other riders, contributing to appealing benefits of shared travel cost and improved access to transportation. However, the majority of existing ride-sharing services rely on a central third party, which make them subject to a single point of failure and privacy disclosure concerns by both internal and external attackers. Moreover, they are vulnerable to distributed denial of service (DDoS) and Sybil attacks due to malicious users involvement. Besides, high service fees should be paid to the ride-sharing service provider. In this paper, we propose a decentralized ride-sharing service based on public Blockchain, named B-Ride. B-Ride enables drivers to propose ride-sharing services without relying on a trusted third party. Both riders and drivers can find rides match while preserving their trip data, including pick-up/drop-off location, departure/arrival date and travel price. However, under the anonymity of the public blockchain, a malicious user may submit multiple ride requests or offers, while not committing to any of them, in order to discover better offer or to make the system unreliable. B-Ride solves this problem by introducing a time-locked deposit protocol for a ride-sharing by leveraging smart contract and zero-knowledge set membership proof. In a nutshell, both a driver and a rider have to show their good willing and commitment by sending a deposit to the blockchain. Later, a driver has to prove to the blockchain on the agreed departure time that he has arrived at the pick-up location. To preserve rider/driver privacy by hiding the exact pick-up location, the proof is performed using zero-knowledge set membership proof. Moreover, to ensure fair service payment, a pay-as-you-derive methodology is introduced based on the elasped distance of the driver and rider. In addition, we introduce a reputation-based trust model to rate drivers based on their past trips without involving any third-parties to allow riders to select them based on their history on the system. Finally, we implement our protocol and deploy it in a test net of Ethereum. The experiment results show the applicability of our protocol atop the existing real-world blockchain.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
O VER the last few years, ride-sharing services (RSSs) have been emerging as an alternative transportation services that allow people to use personal cars more wisely. In RSSs, a driver shares his vacant car seats with other riders who are traveling in the same direction. Thus, contributing to several benefits to the individual and the community at large by increasing occupancy rates, sharing travel costs, extending social circles, and reducing both fuel consumption and air pollution [1] , [2] . Across the world, many providers that offer online ride-sharing services such as Flinc, UberPool, Lyft Line and Blablacar have emerged. According to [3] , the ride sharing market is projected to reach USD 218 billion by 2025.
A ride-sharing service consists in matching drivers with appropriate riders according to their respective ride offers (i.e., planned trips) and ride requests (i.e., desired trips). To enable ride-sharing service, users (i.e., drivers and riders) have to share with a service provider the trip detail information, including departure time and location, and the destination. The service provider works as a middleman to facilitate the communication between the system users and usually charges a commission for each successful ride-share. However, given that users data are centralized and stored at the central service provider, makes the system vulnerable to a single point of failure. If the security of the service provider is compromised, the service can be interrupted and the data can be disclosed, altered, or even deleted. For instance, Uber has witnessed a tremendous data leakage of 57 million customers and drivers for more than a year, and it has paid 148 million just to settle an investigation to its data breach [4] , [5] . Similarly, in April 2015, due to hardware failure in Uber China, a service outage has emerged and passengers were not able to stop their orders at the end of services [6] . In addition, in order to maximize their own benefits, most of the ride-sharing service providers impose a high services fee that can scale up to 20% [7] . In contrast to the traditional client-server model, Blockchain 1 is a verifiable, immutable and distributed ledger that allows mistrusting entities to transact with each other without relaying-on a central third party. Blockchain is a transparent data structure that is organized as a chain of blocks and managed by a network of computers running a peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol. Each block contains a set of transactions that are committed by the network peers according to a predefined consensus algorithm [8] - 1 . In this paper, we remark that blockchain is used to refer open blockchain. A permissionless/public blockchain is a blockchain network that lets any party to participate and leave, as opposed to the less ambitious way of building blockchain atop permissioned parties. [10] . Blockchain has been first introduced as a distributed cryptocurrency that enables the transfer of electronic cash without the intervention of banks. It has evolved, afterward, beyond that to support the deployment of more generalpurpose distributed applications. This concept has been introduced by Vitalik Buterin and refers to it as smartcontracts or decentralized autonomous organizations [11] . Smart-contract can be described as an autonomous computer program running on blockchain network. This program acts as a contract where the terms of the contract can be pre-programmed with the ability to self-execute and selfenforce itself without the need for trusted authorities [12] .
In this paper, we propose to implement a ride-sharing service using smart-contract to mitigate to the single point of failure issues presented in the client-server architecture. However, beside being completely distributed and transparent, the openness of blockchain leads to a potential privacy concern where the data can be publicly accessible. Despite the use of pseudonyms for authentication, this is not sufficient to protect the privacy of the end users. For instance, by tracking the activity of a driver or rider on blockchain, an attacker with a little background knowledge of that user can figure out all his location traces [13] . Moreover, because in public blockchain anyone can join and transact in the network anonymously, malicious users can disturb the function of a blockchain-based ride-sharing by sending, for instance, multiple requests/offers while not committing to any of them. Therefore, it is required to keep track of users' behaviours and build a reputation system that help a user to select with confident an appropriate driver/rider for his ride request/offer, respectively.
Subsequently, in order to decentralize ride-sharing services in a meaningful way, the privacy concern with respect to rid-sharing, needs to be carefully evaluated and addressed. This mainly require to resolve two conflicting objectives, i.e., (i) the desire to have a transparent system while protecting users privacy, and (ii) ensure accountability while being anonymous.
Contribution
Motivated by the above challenges, in this paper, we introduce B-Ride a Blockchain-based Ride sharing services with preserving privacy and establishing trust between drivers 2 and riders. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to employ ride-sharing services atop open and permissionless blockchains. B-Ride aims to remove intermediaries between riders and drivers and make use of blockchain and smart contracts vetting to the future of ride-sharing services.
Our main contributions and the challenges the paper aims to address can be summarized as follows: 1) A blockchain based protocol is proposed to realize decentralized ride-sharing services. To preserve riders' trip privacy, we uses the generalization/cloaking, so a rider posts a generalized pick-up and drop-off location as well as pick-up time. Then, interested drivers uses off-line matching technique to check if the request falls on his generalized route and then send the exact information trip data encrypted with riders' public key. Then, a rider can select the best-matched driver to have a trip based on some heuristics. This acts as a distributed auction that is handled through the blockchain to ensure transparency. 2) To ensure prior trust between a rider and a selected driver, we propose a time-locked deposit protocol for ride-sharing services based on the zero-knowledge set membership [14] . The core idea is to define claim-orfine methodology that works as follows; (i) A rider has to post a smart contract with a deposit budget as an acceptance to a specific driver's offer as well as a set of different obfuscated locations.
(ii) The selected driver also should deposit a budget to the contract as a commitment to his offer. (iii) Upon arrival at the agreed pick-up location, the driver acts as (a prover) and sends a proof to pick-up location to the blockchain. Specifically, the driver proofs that the pick up location falls in a predefined set of cells. (iv) Finally, a smart contract acts as a (verifier) by checking the proof in a zero-knowledge manner and then assign rewards to driver in case of valid proof or fine the driver in case of invalid or if no proof is sent before the agreed pick-up time. 3) Also, we propose a fair service payment in a trustless manner between the driver and rider. A driver needs to send at a regular interval an elapsed distance to the rider who authenticate it by signing it using his private key. Then, once the rider provides proofof-elapsed-distance (i.e., the elapsed distance and driver' signature on it), the smart-contract transfers the fare to the driver. In this way, the driver get paid as he drive. Meanwhile, if the rider stops sending proofs to the blockchain, he can stop the trip immediately. Moreover, only elapsed distances are stored on the blockchain and no other sensitive information are leaked to the public. 4) Finally, B-Ride builds the reputation of drivers based on their prior behaviours in the RSSs. Unlike, current centralized trust approaches [15] , we implement a decentralized reputation management mechanism over the blockchain that is executed in a self-enforcing manner once a predefined set of conditions are met. Specifically, in B-Ride each driver has two reputation indices; (i) The first index is increased every time a driver sends a valid proof of his arrival to the pick-up location.
(ii) The second index is increased upon the completion of each trip. Based on the two indices, each driver will have a trust value in B-Ride that will be used by riders to decide about the drivers to select for their next trips. Our reputation mechanism make economic incentive for drivers to behave correctly, otherwise they will will not be selected by anyone. 5) To showcase the feasibility of applying our protocol, we implement the system on top of Ethereum, a real-world public blockchain platform. Intensive experiments and performance evaluations are conducted in an Ethereum test network. We believe that B-Ride will enable more lucrative jobs in rural regions, where full-time employment is often hard to come by.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss preliminaries used by this research work. We describe the network and threat models, followed by the design goals of our system in Section 3. A detailed desription of our system is presented in Section 4. We present the security, privacy, and computation complexity analysis of our scheme in Section 5. Section 7 discusses the previous research work. Finally, we give concluding remarks in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the necessary background on blockchain, smart contracts and some cryptographic tools that we have used for this research.
Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Blockchain serves as a fundamental structure of emerging cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [16] to help make a peerto-peer exchange of value without a centralized third party. A blockchain is a distributed, immutable, and append-only data structure formed by a sequence of blocks that are chronologically and cryptographically linked togather [11] , [17] . Fundamentally, blockchain is a network composed of a set of nodes called miners or validators are responsible for keeping a trustworthy record of all transactions through a consensus algorithm in a trust-less environment. More importantly, blockchain enables the essence of smart contracts which can be defined as programs that every blockchain node will run them and update their local replicas according to the execution results without fraud or any interference from a third party. The main characteristics of the blockchains are described as follows. Transparency since the transactions stored on the blockchain are visible to all participants in the network. Liveness since all participants can reach the same blockchain and new blocks with valid transactions will continue to be added [13] . Eventual consensus because transactions stored on the blockchain should be validated and a secure consensus protocol ran among all participants to agree on its global state [18] . Blockchain address (Pseudonym), the sender of a message in the blockchain is referred to a pseudonym, known as blockchain address. In practice, a blockchain address is usually bound to the hash of a public key [19] , [20] ; more importantly, the security of digital signatures can further ensure that one cannot send messages in the name of a blockchain address, unless she has the corresponding secret key. Also, the program code of a smart contract deployed in the blockchain can also be referred by a unique address, such that one can call the contract to be executed, by committing a message pointing to this unique address.
Notations
Let PG be a pairing group generator that on input 1 k outputs descriptions of multiplicative groups G 1 and G T of prime order p where |p| = k. Let G * 1 = G 1 \{1}. The generated groups are such that there exists an admissible bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G T meaning that (1) for all a, b ∈ Z p it holds that e g a , g b = e(g, g) ab ; (2) e(g, g) = 1 and (3) the bilinear map is efficiently computable. H is a collision-resist hash function that maps strings of arbitrary length to Z p .We denote u ∈ R Z p as randomly choosing a number from Z p . The one-trip blockchain address used by rider r to anonymously interact with the blockchain.
A pair of time and location.
A ride request (desired trip).
A ride offer (planned trip). q, G1, G2, P, e Public parameters of bilinear pairing
Zero Knowledge Set Membership Proof(ZKSM)
A set membership proof enables a prover to prove, in a zeroknowledge way, that a secret value lies in a given public set. The set can perhaps be a list of cities or clubs. Typically, such proofs can be used, for example, in the context of electronic voting, where a voter is required to prove that his secret vote belongs to the set that contains all possible candidates. We are going to use Camenisch and Stadler [21] notation for proofs of knowledge:
Where Y = g δ h γ is is a Petersen commitment of the integer δ ∈ Z p using randomness γ. The above proof will convince the verifier that the secret in the commitment Y lies in the set φ. The set φ can be a common input to both prover and verifier, and this statement that a proof is a commitment to an element of φ without having to explicitly list φ in the proof. The Set membership proof can be instantiated in the discrete logarithm setting and made non-interactive with Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We refer the readers to [21] for the detailed construction.
The security guarantees are: (i) soundness, that no prover can convince a verifier if she did not compute the results correctly; (ii) zero-knowledge, that the proof distribution can be simulated without seeing any secret state, i.e., it leaks nothing about the witness. Both above will hold with an overwhelming probability.
MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we describe the considered network and threat models. Also, we define the adverbial assumptions. The main notations used in this paper are given in Table. 3.1 System model As depicted in Fig. 1 , the considered system model has the following entities.
1) Blockchain Network. The blockchain network should meet the following properties: (i) Permissionless that
Riders Drivers
LBS
Blockchain Net.
Before-ride comm. On-ride comm. (ii) Support an intrinsic digital currency meaning that the blockchain can be interpreted as a public ledger in which each participating parties have a currency balance. (iii) Support smart contracts (as described in Section 2.1). At the time of this writing, Ethereum [11] is the most widely adopted example of such an open permissionless blockchain which also supports smart contract, and thus is a recommended realization of our proposed work. 2) Drivers and riders. Both drivers and riders are interested parties who seek to share a trip. Drivers/riders use their smart-phones to communicate with the blockchain 3 . Also, besides the localization capabilities (e.g., GPS), the phones of both drivers and riders support peerto-peer wireless communication (e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi Direct) [22] . 3) Location based service (LBS) provider: The LBS provider role is ensure that the pickup location is authentic. In our scheme, driver upon arriving to pickup location, he/she should send pickup to the blockchain. For LBS, it could be the Roadside units in Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANETs) [23] , where each RSU can verify if the location provided by a driver falls in its coverage or not.
Following the principle in ridesharing in practice [24] , we do not require perfectly matching between ride offers and requests (w.r.t. locations and times). Thus, spatial and temporal slacks are introduced to capture the maximum distance δ that the riders can accept to walk, and the 3. Note that drivers and riders are not required to store a complete copy of the blockchain. Instead, they can even run on top of so-called light-weight nodes, which eventually allows them receive and send messages only related to ride sharing activities [5] maximum time τ that they can accept to wait. In this paper, we consider the following ride sharing cases: 1) Identical ridesharing. The pickup and drop off of both a driver and rider match both spatially and temporally as shown in Fig. 2 .a. 2) Inclusive ridesharing. The destination of the rider lies on the driver's route. In this case, driver must stop several times for pick-ups and drop-offs as shown in Fig. 2 .b. There are cases like detour ridesharing in which the driver should first change his route to deliver the rider to its destination. Since these complex type of ride sharing needs decision making by drivers and riders and/or may require adding compensations for detouring. We leave this for our future work.
Adversarial and threat Assumptions
Security threats in a ride sharing system come from both internal and external adversaries. In this paper, we follow the standard blockchain threat model in [13] , blockchain in our proposed design is maintained by a set of validators/miners, and is trusted for execution correctness and availability, but not for privacy. Running on top of it, the smart contract is guaranteed to work as specified, free from tampering. The contract code is visible and checkable by anyone once it is deployed. Likewise, any data submitted and stored to the contract can be directly read by all parties in our system, as well as any others having access to the blockchain. Also, we consider the following adversarial threats that may come from
• Gobal eavesdroppers who can see all previous recorded transactions on the blockchain for the riders such that they seek to learn their moving patterns, guess their locations at a specific time or even track them over the time.
• Adversarial riders and drivers. A portion of riders and drivers can be malicious. For instance, a rider may perform a location cheating attack by reporting a false planned trip to the blockchain, to match a driver in advance and fraudulently not commit to the request such that the driver has to travel a long way to pick up the rider. Likewise, A driver may unfairly match more riders while deliberately not committing to this offers or by accepting other better ride offers.
• Cheating in the fare payment. Another misbehaviour in a RSS is the fare payment of the trip. If the driver get paid before start the trip, he/she may misbehave and do not complete the trip. Also, if the driver gets the trip fare at the end of trip, the rider may be not willing to pay the fare [25] .
Design Goals
Under the aforementioned system model and adversarial assumptions, our design goal is to develop a ride-sharing service with the following design goals: 1) Achieves decentralization. The proposed scheme should enable decentralized ride sharing services to avoid centralized ride-matching agencies. 2) Preserving riders' privacy. The proposed scheme should preserve riders privacy including their trip data i.e., pick up/drop off. This can be satisfied if the following two conditions can be achieved: (i) none of the drivers/miners except for the selected driver learns the exact position of the rider or the driver.
(ii) A specific rider cannot be tracked over time. 3) Ensuring prior trust between riders and drivers. The proposed work should discourage malicious behaviour of both drivers and riders under the permissionless framework of the blockchain. This objective is a challenge especially under the open public permissionless blockchain. 4) Fair service payment. The service payment should be done in a trust-less manner. The scheme should protect honest drivers from dishonest riders and also protect honest riders from dishonest drivers. 5) Reputation Management: The proposed scheme should keep track of drivers' behavior in the system. Malicious drivers who may try to subvert the system, even irrationally may be identified by a low reputation. By having a trust value for each driver, if a driver misbeahves, his reputation worsens and the other riders mistrust him more and more and are less and less interested to interact with him.
OUR PROPOSED SCHEME: B-RIDE
In this section, we discuss in details B-Ride with six phases: trip data generation, bidding and selection phase, Timelocked deposit protocol, fair service payment, reputation trust management. A driver (independent person or company) becomes a legitimate entity after registration on the registration authority, such as the government by getting a certificate bound to his/her identity. A driver, d having a unique identity (e.g., license plate number), creates a public-secret key pair K 
Generating Trip data
In this stage, we discuss who the drivers/riders create their planned trips. For privacy preservation reasons, we use the generalization technique [2] or rather known as Spatial cloaking. The main idea of such technique is to blur a user's exact location into a spatial region in order to preserve his location privacy. We assume the ride sharing area A (e.g., a state) where the ride sharing services are deployed is divided into geographic areas, called cells. A possible design for such cells could be a predefined geog graphic area (e.g., districts or neighborhoods in a city, uniform partitions in a map, etc). Fig. 3 illustrates the division of the state of Tennessee, USA. Also, the exact pick-up/drop-off times are generalized to time intervals T (e.g., 5 min, 10 min, 15 min, etc.)
For a driver d who is interested in sharing his vehicle with others, he/she should perform the following. 1) For each driver d ,we denote his planned trip (i.e., ride offer)
that consists of an origin and set off time l
, a destination and estimated arrival time l
, and a sequence of optionally intermediate locations and their corresponding times l
2) Then, the driver d generalizes his exact trip locations and times to zones and time intervals as follows:
where
represents the generalized location and time corresponding to 
where the number of possible trips φ depends on the number of points n in the driver' trip and it can be mathematically expressed as [26] For a rider r, we denote its ride request as
that specifies an origin and desired set off time l
and a destination l (r)
1 . Similar to the driver, the rider also convert the request into the generalized form by mapping the locations (resp. times) of the request into the
Note that generating the drivers' trip table and the rider planned trip (3), (4) are done off the blockchain and can be done previously using the driver/rider smart phone devices.
Bidding and selection phase
In this subsection, we describe the process of matching riders requests with drivers offers atop public blockchain. A schematic diagram of this phase is illustrated in Fig. 4 . This phase is done as follows.
Publishing the ride request
First, as a fundamental concept to avoid de-anonymization in the blockchain, we let a rider r to generate a temporary public/private key pair (K pri r , K pub r ) (e.g., by using ECDSA) and a corresponding blockchain address ADD r (i.e., a one-request-only address for each ride request. The address ADD r is used interact with the blockchain (e.g., submitting the ride sharing request contract, adding deposit, selecting drivers or receiving refunds).
Then, a rider publishes a ride request that contains his/her generalized pickup/drop off (C orig . Also, the request should include deadline of receiving driver's offers. Optionally, the request can include maximum number of offers to be received. Note that this request should be signed by the temporary private key of the rider, and once the miners validate the corresponding signature of the rider, it will have immutable address L and be public to all drivers.
Submitting drivers' biddings
After the riders publish their requests to the blockchain, interested drivers can routinely query the blockchain for new requests or some out-of-band signaling protocol can be used to notify drivers of new riders' requests [27] . Then, drivers evaluates the request by checking whether the request Λ (r) satisfy the spatio-temporal features of their own planned
Then, the offer should include all necessary information for the rider such as the exact pick-up and corresponding time pair
, the exact drop-off and corresponding time pair
dest and the offer bid price B di (e.g., price per mileage).
Then, the driver uses the rider public key to encrypt all above information to obtian C i
Where E is asymmetric encryption algorithm e.g., RSA, DSA. This is required to prevent adversaries from getting such sensitive information except the rider Then, the driver send the tuple C di B di as a transaction to the blockchain. Note that we do not allow the driver to encrypt the bidding price so that to allow drivers to send competitive prices. Therefore, riders can make use of this auction and select based on their preferences in a trasperent way. Note that since the rider request includes the a deadline to receive 
Cell-time generalized Pair
Cell (C) Time Interval (T) 
Finding Feasible Matches
After the contract L collects for example n offers {C d1 , · · · , C dn }, a rider r first retrieve the encrypted offers from the blockchain and decrypts each bid using his secret key. Then, the rider can evaluate the offers as follows.
1) Checks whether the driver pick-up and drop-off locations match both -spatially (within the rider space) using:
-and temporarily (within the rider time) as in
2) Besides, in B-Ride, each driver sending an offer should have a reputation trust value β di that is stored on the blockchain. The details of how each driver trust reputation value is discussed in details in the next subsections. Based on δ r , τ r , bid price B di and drivers' trust value β Di , the rider can select the best matched driver as follows:
Note that selecting the best offer depends on different riders' preferences. For instance, some may prefer an offer with a high space slack δ r but with a low bid price. Note that The bidding and selection phase is handled over the blockchain and is therefore fully transparent unlike existing centralized approaches
Illustrative example for the selection/matching phase
To make a concrete example of the selection process. Assume a driver d i who has a fixed route that is shown in Fig 3. The driver's route starts in Knoxville, and ends in Nashville with four points of interest that lies on the his road. Note that, defining these points depends on the driver himself. For example, for drivers who may not be willing to have many stop points on their trip, they can just define small number of point of interests. Then, using these locations, Table II gives the exact location cordinates with corresponding times of the planned trip. As discussed previously in Sec. 4.1, the driver's route should be generalized/mapped to as given in Table III according to cell divions given in Fig. 3 of Tennessee. Then, the driver creates his own trip table Create a sub-contract of Algorithm 2
contains possible trips he can share his ride as indicated in Table IV . let a rider r is looking for a ride with the following features: Then, the rider publishes a ride request to the blockchain that contains generalized points of his request, Λ (r) = {(U tica, 45222211, Syracuse)} Then, Up on posting this transaction to the blockchain, interested drivers determine if they can send ride offers or not. For example, based on the trip table of driver in Table  IV , the driver can determine that the rider request is in its route i.e., the 4th element in Table IV . Then, he/she sends the exact pick-up, drop-off and time encrypted to the the rider. Finally, the rider evaluate the offer and compare it with other driver's offers received and decide best matched offer.
Time-locked deposit for ride-sharing
After the bidding and selection of phase, in B-Ride, we address the following challenge "can we ensure fairness between riders and drivers and mitigate rational adversaries (from both drivers and riders) from misbehaving under the fully decentralized framework of the blockchain?". In other words, assume anonymous driver who made a ride request on the blockchain and intentionally do not commit to that request. The same goes for drivers. Usually, a traditional solution to the previous challenge is to allow both parties (i.e., drivers and riders) to pay a subscription fee to a trusted agency that can be contacted to restore fairness whenever fairness is breached. However, this solution may fail since a honest party has to expend extra effort to restore fairness by contacting the trusted party whenever a breach occurs [28] . Also, an adversary essentially gets away with cheating since an third party must be trusted to not collude with the adversary.
Inspired by [28] , we propose a time-locked deposit protocol for ride-sharing service leveraging smart contracts. A smart contract accepts a rcoins deposit from a "rider" and a dcoins and the contract conditionally transfers the contract balance ( both rider and driver deposits) to the "driver" if he arrives to the rider pick-up location of the predefined agreed time. If the driver defaults, then both deposits is returned to the rider after a prespecified time as a fine to the driver. Note that conditions defined on a smart contract and handled over the blockchain, ensures that they are completely transparent and secure. However, defining these conditions is another challenge due to privacy concerns. In other words, how the driver can prove to the blockchain that he has arrived to the agreed rider pick-up location (so the blockchain enforces rewards) without revealing such sensitive information on the public blockchain.
Our strategy is to adopt the zero-knowledge set membership proof (ZKSM) protocol presented in Sec. 2.3. In nutshell, after selecting an offer from a driver, the rider should publishes a contract with the a predefined set of locations as well as his deposit. the driver acts as a prover who should prove to the blockchain verifier in a zero-knowledge that he arrived to pick-up location without revealing exactly which pick-up location has been used by the (prover) driver. A schematic diagram of the time-locked deposit protocol is depicted in Fig. 5 .
Detailed of the time-locked deposit protocol is given in the following phases.
Service Initialize:
In this phase, the rider do the following. 1) First, he defines a set φ of m locations where φ = { 1 , · · · , m }. Note that the set should include the rider pick-up location
o as well as a set of other obfuscated locations. 2) Then, he picks a random number x ∈ R Z p and computes a corresponding public y ∈ g x , where g be the generator of the order −q subgroup of Z p 3) Then, for every element i ∈ φ, he computes a signature A i = g 1 (x+i) . Finally, the rider publishes a contract given in Algorithm. 2 with the set φ and A i to the blockchain.
Claim or fine functionality
First, the driver should verify the rider signature on each element in φ using the co responding public key 4 . This is required to enable the driver to prove to the smart contract that the agreed pick-up location is a valid element in the set φ. If the verification succeeds, the driver should add a deposit d coins to the contract within a window time e.g., 4 min (See line 15 in Algorithm 2). This is required for two 4 . The purpose of this verification is to prevent a malicious rider from falsely setting-up the ZKSM protocol so he can manipulate the rewards 
Send D Deposit
Send D deposit coins to contract as an offer acceptance.
Claim if the proof is valid: 1) Send the contract balance to the driver if proof is valid;
2) Update driver reputation.
Refine
Send the contract balance to the passenger as a fine to the driver. reasons. First to indicate that both the driver and the rider accept to have a planned trip together. In other words, if the driver does not add his deposit, this means he will is not committing to the trip. Second, to fine the driver in case of not committing to his offer in the agreed time. Then, later on, once the driver arrives to the pick-up location, a claim of fine functionality works as follows. 1) First, the driver picks v ∈ R Z p and o h r where h be a random group element such that it is hard to find the discrete logarithm of g base h or vice versa. Also, he computes a signature σ r ( 2) Then, the LBS provider verifies if the provided location of the driver is authentic. One possible way is to allow the roadside unit in the VANET to ensure if received location falls in its coverage. The, the LBS Computes
where the h r is the public key corresponding to r. Then, the LBS verifies the driver signature σ r (l
o ) is valid using the driver public key h r . Then, the LBS send a signature on the C σ LBS (C) back to the driver.
3) The driver picks random numbers s, t, m ∈ R Z p and computes 
Service Initialize
Claim or fine functionality Rider Authentication
• Computes
Publishes smart contract, with: -the set φ and A i -the ride deposit Receives d coins from the driver, transfer the contract balance to the driver if he provides a proof that have committed to being in the pick-up location.
• Picks r ∈ Z p
• Picks s, t, m and computes because either (i) validating nodes i.e., miners can not properly agree on how to choose those challenges, since in many constructions we have to choose them randomly, while the verification algorithm of ZKSM must be deterministic in order to reach consensus; or (ii) because it would make the communication complexity of our system very poor. Nevertheless, the FiatShamir heuristic [30] is a generic technique that allows to convert interactive zero-knowledge schemes into noninteractive protocols. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, a challenge c can be calculated from public parameters as follows
c, z v = t − vc and z r = m − rc. Then, the proof of ZKSM is denoted as π = C c a Q z σ z v z r . Finally, he sends π σ LBS (C) as a transaction to the blockchain.
4) Once the contract T receives the set-mempership proof
π, it should verify whether the proof is from the selected driver as well as check whether the time of receiving the proof lies on the generalized rider pick-up time (See lines 19-20 in Algorithm 2). Then, proving that C is a commitment to an element ∈ φ can be validated by the following statement [14] .
Proving the statement in 7, is done in the blockchain as follows by checking the following conditions:
Once the function PROOFOFARRIVAL(seeline) validate the two conditions in 8, 9, the driver will claim his deposit back and the rider driver. Due to the Soundness and Completeness property of ZKSM [14] , the contract will accept the proof if it is correctly constructed by the driver. If the driver aborts or breaks the task his commitment which is pre-defined in the time locked deposit protocol, he will be fined with a monetary penalty that goes to the rider account. This can happen once the time expired, the rider can call the function RefineDriver() (see line in Algoritm).
Driver/rider authentication
After the validating the proof and receiving the rewards, it is required prevent malicious rider (who does not initialize the contract with the ride deposit) from having a free-ride with the driver. Therefore, the actual rider who made the ride reservation should authenticate himself to the driver. In specific, the rider should prove to the driver in zero knowledge that he/she indeed knows the value of private key corresponding to the public key that made the reservation. The driver (the verifier) selects a uniformly random integer (S ∈ Z p as a challenge as sends it to the rider (the prover). The rider should calculate a signature on the challenge σ P K R (S) and sends (S σ P K R (S)) to the driver. Finally, the driver Verifies if V erif ySig(pk r , σ s {s}, S) = 1.
If the rider passes these verification step, the driver can start the trip with the rider.
Fair payment without trust between the rider/driver
Finally, in B-Ride, we address the following challenge how should a decentralized platform can protect riders from dishonest drivers and protect drivers from dishonest riders in the fare calculation?
In current RSS, a driver uses his personal smartphone to report the distance and duration of each ride for fare calculation to the service provider. Then, the service provider can calculate the fare of the trip. However, smartphones are general-purpose devices and are easy to tamper with. Thus, a malicious driver can modify her smartphone to report longer ride distances to the and, as a result, charge a higher fare. This problem is usually referred to as overcharging [22] , [25] . In addition, if the payment is done at the beginning of the trip, a dishonest driver may intentionally not complete the trip. Also, if the payment is done at the end of the trip, a dishonest rider may intentionally pay the fare.
In B-Ride, we tackle above challenges using the methodology pay-as-you-drive as follows. After starting the trip, the rider should post a contract with a budget deposit. Note that the down payment used in the time locked deposit protocol should be used as a part of the trip fare. Every short period of time, say every minute, the driver should send elapsed distance to the rider. The rider checks whether the distance provided matches the distance elapsed. Note that the elapsed distance can be created using a smart phone with a GPS. And then generate a signature on that distance and send it to the smart contract. The function ProofOfDistance (see lines [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] in Algorithm. 3 ) will validate the rider signature. Then the payment corresponds to that distance will go to the driver address. By this way, the rider can ensure that the the payment is done according to the actual distance that has been travelled. More importantly, if the rider stops sending proofs, the driver can stop the ride, and vice versa if the driver decides not to stop the trip, he/she will not get any payment. Finally, if the rider does not arrive in the a pre-agreed time in the driver offer. The remaining payment can back to the rider account (See function Refund in algorithm ). This encourage the driver to complete the trip in the agreed time.
Reputation Trust Management
In B-Ride, the driver can proof his arrival to the pickup location, but intentionally not meet/or not take the rider. In this case, the system cannot distinguish if the rider or the driver is sheeting. To ensure that the driver will not misbehave again (in case he is the one who misbehaved), we will record this in the blockchain as a suspecting behavior, if this will happen lot of time in the future, this will affect his reputation and his future offers will not be accepted by riders. In other words, we are interested in the accountability of drivers in a decentralized ride-sharing system. The reason for why we focus on the driver, since riders have to pay deposit when they accept a driver offer and the driver has the responsibly to prove his arrival to the pick-up Each driver is assigned with a reputation index which can be viewed as one of the important reference for riders when they choose a certain driver offer. A high reputation index of driver can reflect their behaviour and to building trust among drivers and riders. Unlike traditional ride sharing schemes where the reputation management is managed and controlled by the third party, we define the protocols and implement them in the decentralized blockchain. Each driver is tagged with a reputation index β d . Each driver has two reputation indices value, one related to his proof of arrival to the agreed pick up location β 
A higher β d i.e., β d > 1 denotes that a greedy driver do not commit to his offers. Meanwhile, drivers with β d ≤ 1 means the driver is mostly trusted and he is committing to his ride offers. Therefore, a rider can decline a ride offer from a driver if his reputation in the system is low. β d . 
Algorithm 2:
Pseudocode for time locked deposit contract T in B-Ride 1 contract TimeLockedDeposit 2
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section we evaluate our proposed system B-Ride. Usually, anything within the blockchain environment is refereed as being on-chain, while anything that exists outside the blockchain is referred as off-chain. Fig. 7 shows a a proofof-concept implementation of our system B-Ride.
On-chain cost
Etherum Baselines and Performance Metrics
Ethereum has two native tokens: ether and gas. Ether is the currency, ethers are minted by miners and traded on exchanges. Gas, on the other hand, is used to run smart contract code. Separating ether and gas allows the gas cost of an operation to be hard-coded in the Ethereum protocol. By separating ether and gas, the price of ether is decoupled from the price of using Ethereum. Therefore, the costs listed in the Ethereum protocol can be static, while a user can determine how much ether a unit of gas is worth per transaction at a given time. Each operation in a smart contract has a fixed cost. For instance, the addition of two variables requires 3 gas, multiplication costs 5 and computing a SHA3 hash needs 30 gas plus 6 gas for every 256 bits of input [11] . Therefore, for the on-chain cost, we are interested in the following Metrics.
• Transaction cost. is the overall gas cost to complete the transaction to the blockchain, • Execution cost. indicates the portion of gas spent on the code manipulating data and computation on the EVM.
• Storage cost. Denotes the cost of storing the data in blockchain.
Previous metrics can be translated to compute direct monetary cost on both drivers and riders, and hence the practicality, of running our platform. Note: Note that in the PAIRING, k denotes the number of points or, equivalently, the length of the input divided by 192. The variables for computing the gas cost of EXPMOD are specified in details in EIP 1981 8 . The other three operations act on the elliptic curve alt bn128.
Implementation and Results
We have implemented a smart contract for Algorithm in Solidity 5 . B-Ride 6 were deployed into the public Kovan Testnet 7 . However, in B-Ride, verifying the ZKSM requires some calculation-intensive mathematical and cryptographic functions to be done in the time-locked deposit protocol. However, implementing these functions in a high-level language, such as Solidity, which inturn would require the execution to be costly in terms of the gas. Therefore, these functions have been implemented as a precompiled contract, which creates a dedicated opcode for these operations. By using precompiled contracts, less gas is required, as the code is not run on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), but rather on the machine hosting the Ethereum client. Typically, a precompiled contract is assigned a fixed address and gas price and can be invoked using the call operation. Table 2 gives the precompiled contracts used in this paper. Fig. 8a reports the gas consumption costs on the rider. About 330K gas is required for publishing the bidding contract. Then, 80 Kgas is required to retrieve the drivers' offers. 320 K gas is needed to deploy the time-locked deposit contract. 340K gas is required for the deploying the payment contract, and 42K gas is needed for calling the ProofOfDistance function. Fig. 8b reports the gas consumption required by a driver to complete a trip. First the driver requires 89K gas to send his encrypted offers to the bidding contract. Then, once the driver is selected to start a trip, he needs 25 Kgas to send his deposit to the time-locked contract. Finally, to validate the proof (π) lies in the set, verifing the ZKSM requires 360K gas. Fig. 9 shows the estimated total cost of driver versus the number of riders, given different gas prices 0.5, 5 and Gwei and Ether price $217 as of June 25th, 2019 [31] . Having 40 trips, the driver costs about $ 2. By increasing the gas price, the driver costs increase to reach $ 7.6 for completing 40 trips. It can be clearly seen that the cost is practically affordable Fig. 10 gives storage cost in Bytes on the blockchain in BRide. It can clearly seen that as the number of offers received by drivers increases, the storage increases. For example, for 5 . https://github.com/ethereum/solidity 6. We note that B-Ride contract in Algorithm 1 can be coded as a single "factory contract" in which upon receiving a message with the variable arguments from both entities i.e., riders and drivers, will create a new instance of the child contracts Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 7. https://kovan.etherscan.io 7 offers received, the storage on the blockchain is about 12 KBytes. 7 We consider these results practically acceptable.
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Analysis of the protocol
Correctness and efficiency. In B-Ride, the rider will have the trip and the driver would receive the right amount of payment. If they all follow the protocol, under the conditions that (i) the blockchain can be modeled as an ideal public ledger, (ii) the underlying SKSM is of completeness, and (iii) the public key encryption is correct. Regarding efficiency, we note the on-chain compuutaion interms of gas consumption and and storage is actually light. Moreover, in ZKSM, using the precompiled contracts, the verification can be efficiently executed by checking only a few pairing equalities.
Security analysis (sketch).
We briefly discuss security of BRide.
Regarding the data confidentiality of riders' activities in BRide, all related public transcripts are simply the ciphertexts C 1 , . . . , C n , the ZKSM proof π, and the elapsed distances of the trip. The ciphertexts are easily simulatable according to the semantic security of the public key encryption, and the proof π can also be simulated without knowing the secret due to the zero-knowledge property. And by elapsed distance can not reveal any information since it is explicitly known to the rider and the driver.
Regarding the anonymity of riders, an adversary has two ways to break it:(i) link a driver/rider through his blockchain addresses; (ii) link offers/requests of a driver/rider through his proofs of arrival. (ii) link o a driver/rider in the payment phase. The first case is trivial, simply because the rider will interact with a randomly generated one-request-only blockchain address (and the corresponding public key). The second case is more involved, but the anonymity of the rider can be ensured by the zeroknowledge property of the underlying ZKSM. Moreover, the rider can change the set elements each for each trip by having different locations in the set. This is allowed due to the feature of the ride-sharing model in which rider can walk to reach the driver. The last threat is prevented because only the elapsed distance of the trip is pubic and no other information about the rider destination is leaked to others.
Regarding the security against a malicious rider, a malicious rider has four chances to gain advantage: (i) submit multiple requests to intentionally make fake reservations; (ii) cheat in the ZKSM set-up phase by providing a set φ with fake signatures A i for the set elements in order to prevent the driver from claiming his trip deposit; (iii) sending the contract a fake instruction i.e., proof of arrival to pick-up in the name of driver to manipulate the claim/fine phase; (iii) cheat in payment phase. The first one is mitigated since drivers only accept to plan a trip with a rider only after he adds a ride deposit to the smart contract. The second threat is prevented because the time-locked smart contract is public, and the driver can validate the ZKSM set-up using the security of digital signatures. The third threat is handled by the security of digital signatures since the contract has to ensure the driver is the one who should claim the trip deposit. The last issue is trivial, since the public blockchain security enables the driver to check if the rider provides a valid elapsed distance to the payment contract.
Regarding Security against malicious drivers, the ways that malicious drivers can cheat are: (i) submitting multiple ride offers to intentionally let other riders to have fake planned trips to make the system unreliable; (ii) cheat by claiming riders' deposits and not complete the trips with them; (iii) cheat in payment phase. The first threat is mitigated by letting the driver to add a deposit to the time-locked deposit contract. Moreover, if the driver does not provide a proof of arrival to pick-up location, he will be fined by this deposit. The second threat is prohibited by the soundness of the underlying zkSM, which means any incorrect instruction to pass the verification in the smart contract, directly violates the proof-of-knowledge. Moreover, our system builds a reputation system for the driver incase of proofing the arrival to the pick-up and starting the trip with the rider. In this case, the driver reputation index of arriving to the pick will increase significantly with his reputation index of competed trips. The third threat is simply handled by allowing the rider to check the distance provide by the driver.
B-Ride have the following security/privacy features
1) Enable decentralized ride-sharing service. Thanks to the blockchain technology, no single entity or authority is required to monopolize the system for its own benefit or even to some drivers than others. Moreover, the selection process of drivers and riders works as a distributed auction that is handled over the blockchain that ensures transparency for both entities. Also, B-Ride uses smart contracts which are immutable and tamper-proof that no party can alter their code or interfere with their execution without the consent of all the nodes in the network. 2) Preserve privacy of riders' activities. In B-Ride, the privacy of riders (their ride requests including the pickup, drop-off and pick-up times) is protected by (i) replacing the rider's real identities by some placeholders (pseudonyms) for ride requests that correspond to temporary public-private key pairs. The pseudonym expires once the rider finishes a ride request to the blockchain which ensures unlinkabilty.
(ii) The use of generalization/cloaking technique in the bidding and selection phase, preserves the rider trip information. As the size of the generalized area increases, the privacy of a ride request is well preserved. 3) Achieves backward privacy. B-Ride prevents an adversary with a background knowledege of a specific rider pickup location (for example, his home or work address) to discover information about his trip or track him over time (This is known as backward privacy). This is because drivers offers are encrypted by the rider temporary public key which changes for each ride request. (iii) Also, by using zero-knowledge set membership proof allows the driver (the prover) to prove to the blockchain that the pick-up location is in the predefined set defined by the rider with conceals the exact location to the blockchain (verifier). 4) Ensure prior trust between drivers and riders. In B-Ride, both the rider and the selected driver should lock deposits to a time-locked deposit contract. By this way, anonymous riders are encouraged to commit to thier ride requests since they lose their deposit if they do not commit to the request. Also, a driver who does not proof his arrival to the pick-up location is penalized. 5) Achieves fair service payment. B-Ride enables payment in a trust-less manner between the rider and driver without involvement of any third parties/intermediaries. Both the rider is aware of the elapsed distance and the payment will be done in case of both parties agree on it. If a dishonest rider stops sending the proof that they are together, no payment can be done and the driver can stop the ride. Also, since the blockchain is tamperproof, the fair payment smart contract is executed and the promised fare will be delivered if the suitable proof will be provided. 6) Achieves Reputation managment of drivers. B-Ride builds a reputation managment system that is designed such that rational drivers (even if purely selfish ones) are interested in honestly cooperating in the system. Due to the tamper-proof nature of the blockchain, driver reputation history can not be tampered with. Unlike centralized managment systems, our management is controlled by conditions defined by smart contracts. Therefore, selfish drivers who wants to deviate from our system will be identified by low trust values. Also, our reputation mechanism is robust against tampering attacks in centralized setting where the third party can even unfairly change a driver reputation positively or negatively. 7) Resist to double reservation attack. An anonymous rider can not accept a ride twice since accepting an offer requires the rider to lock coins to the time-locked deposit contract. If a rider accepts two offers, he has to lose his deposits.
RELATED WORK
Ride-sharing received a lot of attention in the literature [35] . Security and privacy in the centralized setting (client-server model) of ride-sharing service is discussed in [22] , [36] . Some companies starts developing a blockchain based ride sharing platform e.g, DACSEE 10 arcade city 11 but without location privacy or anonymity. In the following, we review some of the existing solutions. Table. 3 compares with BRide with existing platforms.
In the centralized-setting, in [32] , SRide has been proposed to address the matching between between drivers and riders in ridesharing systems while protecting the privacy of users against both the service provider and curious users. The service provider uses a filtering protocol based on homomorphic arithmetic secret sharing and secure twoparty equality test to determine the subset of drivers with whom the rider can travel.
A decentralized ride sharing scheme with reputation is proposed in [2] . The scheme uses Pastry application to enable proximity-based message route and topic-oriented multicast which limits message broadcasting for each user. However, the scheme enables riders to disclose part of the matched drivers' routes even though they will not share the rider. However, the scheme suffer from the double reservation attack since a rider can select multiple drivers offers and not committing to them.
In [37] , a general blockchain-based intelligent transportation framework is proposed. Also, a case study is presented to discuss the impact of using blockchain in real-time ridesharing services. Semenko et al. [38] proposed a distributed platform for ride-sharing services. The authors suggest having an overlay network that includes all ride-sharing agencies called service nodes to constitute the network layer. The service node is responsible for matching drivers with riders. However, the platform needs trusted infrastructure to run it, and hence may fail in case of one service node is compromised which in turn will lead to inherent problems in the client-server model. Meng et al. [39] proposed a ride-sharing scheme using vehicular fog computing. Road Side Units (RSUs) installed at roads enable local matching between riders and drivers. Anonymous authentication is used to authenticate users while recovering malicious users real identities. A private blockchain made of RSUs is presented to record ride-sharing data in an immutable ledger to enable data auditability. However, using limited resources devices such as RSUs to store massive records of ridesharing data may be impractical especially in urban areas where there is a high demand to ride-sharing services. 10 . https://dacsee.com/ 11. https://arcade.city/
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have a decentralized ride sharing serivce based on the revolutionry public blockchain named B-Ride. The system is decentralized since all interactions are done through the blockchain, and it does not require any company or organization to manage it, and the matching of drivers with ride requests. Moreover, in B-Ride, there is no need to reveal any private information such a email address, phone number or credit card number, and generalized locations are only revealed to drivers. In addtion, to ensure prior trust between drivers and riders, we have proposed a time-locked deposit proctol that encourge divers and riders to behave well in the system. Zero-knowledge set membership is adopted so the driver can prove in zero-knolwede that the he arrived to the rider pick-up location. Besides, we using smart contracts and blockchain, we proposed a fare payment based on elapsed distance. Finally, in B-Ride, each driver should have a trust value in the system and stored on the blockchain. Our evaluations shows that B-Ride are practical with acceptable gas consumption and storage cost. The efficiency and practicality of our designs are also demonstrated by extensive experiments. 
